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The preface paradox dissolved 
by 
J O H N  N .  WILLIAMS 
(National University of Singapore) 
I. Introduction 
T h e  preface paradox strikes us as puzzling because we feel that if a 
person holds a set of inconsistent beliefs, i.e. beliefs such that at 
least one of them must be incorrect, then he should give at least one 
of them up. Equally, if a person’s belief is rational, then he has a 
right to hold it. Yet the preface example is prima facie a case in 
which a person holds an inconsistent set of beliefs each of which is 
rational, and thus a case in which that person has a duty to relin- 
quish what he has a right to keep. 
I shall argue that counterintuitive appearances are not always 
deceptive; the preface case demonstrates the possibility of rational 
inconsistent belief. Attempts to deny the inconsistency of the case 
by giving it a probabilistic treatment misrepresent it. On the other 
hand, attempts to deny the rationality of the case by insisting upon 
the dependence of the available sets of evidence, stem from a 
crucial failure to recognise that the relevant beliefs are inconsistent 
rather than contradictory. 
It might be thought that this distinction is trivial, but it has 
important consequences for rational belief. One reason for ignoring 
it is a misguided ‘conjunction principle’, namely that belief or 
rational belief in various propositions entails a belief or rational 
belief in their conjunction. It is this principle that gives the example 
its air of paradox. Once we make explicit and abandon the conjunc- 
tion principle, the example can be seen as a possible and perhaps 
natural kind of situation. 
I am grateful to Paul Gilbert, Richard McDonough, Toomas Karmo and the referee 
for suggestions and criticisms of earlier drafts of this paper. 
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11. Attempted solutions 
The preface case is as follows. An author writes a book consisting of 
a number of statements s l ,  s2, . . . sn, each of which he believes on 
the basis of its respective grounds g l ,  82, . . . gn. However, he also 
has evidence el’ for the general belief that not all of s l ,  s2, . . . sn 
are true. In the preface he expresses this belief that - (sl & s2 & 
. . . sn) while still believing each statement in the book. A paradox 
seems to arise because although the set of his beliefs is inconsistent, 
each belief is rational because each is supported by independent 
evidence. 
Attempts to solve the ‘paradox’ either deny the inconsistency or 
the rationality of the author’s beliefs. Probabilistic readings of the 
case deny the inconsistency. For if the author believes that probably 
s l  is true, believes that probably s2 is true, . . . believes that prob- 
ably sn is true and believes that probably not all the statements in 
the book are true, then his beliefs are consistent. For the conjunc- 
tion of propositions believed, i.e. [(It is probable that sl is true & It 
is probable that s2 is true & . . . It is probable that sn is true & It is 
probable that - (sl & s2 & . . . sn)] is logically possible. While the 
likelihood of each individual statement being true may be high, 
there may be so many of them, that the likelihood of them all being 
true is extremely low. 
But even if “modesty. . . demands no more in a preface than the 
statement ‘Probably there are errors in my book”’ ([15], p. 614, 
italics in original), nonetheless an author can sincerely express a 
belief that there are, or even that there certainly are, errors, where 
this belief is supported by e l .  For example, in his preface to A 
Hundred Years of Philosophy, Passmore says: 
This book contains a large number of errors . .  . simple slips and plain 
mistakes. So much I know apriori, but not, of course, what they are. ([19], 
P. 8) 
Moreover, it is implausible to suggest that the author believes of 
1. I will follow the traditional terminology here, but without intending any distinc- 
tion between pieces of evidence and grounds. 
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each of his statements only that it is probably true. This is too weak 
for the case in which we are interested. One cannot deny the 
possibility inherent in the example merely by changing it. 
New has suggested ([17], p. 343) that evidence for the disclaimer 
in the preface, i.e. that - (sl  & s2 & . . . sn) is relevant to each 
belief that s l ,  that s2, etc., because it reduces the probability of 
each of s l ,  s2, . . . sn, equally. 
But this is false. A conjunction can be improbable relative to a set 
of evidence without its conjuncts being improbable relative to that 
same evidence. If my evidence for the proposition that Assassin A 
and Assassin B did not both murder a certain politician is that in 
numerous past assassinations both have always preferred to work 
alone, then relative to that information it is improbable that A and 
B both murdered the politican. But it is neither improbable that A 
murdered him nor improbable that B did, relative to that informa- 
tion. If three balls are taken at random from three separate urns, 
each containing 50 % white and 50 % black balls, then, relative to 
the information that this has been done, the probability that not all 
of the three balls are black is high (i.e. 1 - (1/2 x 1/2 x 1/2), i.e. 
718). But relative to the same information, the probability of each 
ball not being black is still only 1/2. 
But even if one accepts New’s view, it does not solve the paradox. 
If rationality demands that the author reduce the strength of each of 
his beliefs that s l ,  that s2, . . . that sn, nonetheless he can still 
justifiably retain each of these beliefs through the warrant of their 
respective grounds g l ,  82, . . . gn. Since his belief expressed in the 
preface is justified by the evidence e l ,  the ‘paradox’ remains, for he 
believes inconsistently and yet rationally. 
The view seems a plausible solution of the paradox only so long 
as one assimilates the justification of believing each of the state- 
ments with the justification of believing all of them. To state the 
crux of my position: the source of the paradox in the preface case is 
not that we are forced to take contradictory attitudes towards the 
conjuncrion of statements in the book (as supposed by [13], p. 122, 
[21], p. 211), i.e. not that ‘in the light of g l ,  82, . . . gn, we would be 
right to believe the conjunction: [of statements] but in the light of 
e l  we would be right to disbelieve it’ ([17], p. 343). 
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The original case is not one in which the author believes, much 
less expresses a belief in, the conjunction of his statements; there- 
fore he does not hold contradictory beliefs, but inconsistent ones. 
This point is importantly relevant to the question of independence 
of evidence. If a person believes that s l ,  believes that s2, . . . 
believes that sn and believes that - (sl & s2 & . . . sn), then he does 
not hold contradictory beliefs (as he would if he believed that [sl & 
s2 & . . . sn] and believed that - [sl & s2 & . . . sn]) since there are 
no two beliefs which contradict each other. Moreover, the subtrac- 
tion of any one of his beliefs has the result that it is now possible for 
all his remaining beliefs to be correct. Yet, since the conjunction of 
what he believes is not possibly true (perhaps one could admit, self-  
contradictory) his beliefs are inconsistent. To make a distinction I 
have defended elsewhere ([28]), while all believers who hold con- 
tradictory beliefs hold inconsistent ones, not all believers who hold 
inconsistent beliefs hold contradictory ones. 
To look at the preface case as if it were a case in which contradic- 
tory beliefs are held is akin to committing one of Whately’s ‘test 
fallacies’: 
He who believes himself to be always in the right in his opinion, lays claim 
to infallibility: you always believe yourself to be in the right in your 
opinion: therefore you lay claim to infallibility ([26], Appendix 11, example 
108, p. 250). 
Even assuming that a person who believes himself to be always in 
the right in his opinion, thereby lays claim to infallibility (which 
ignores the modal nature of infallibility) a person who always 
believes himself to be right in his opinion, certainly does not. The 
author in the preface case always believes himself to be right in his 
opinion (for each statement considered in turn in the book) and yet 
believes that he is not always right in his opinion (in the preface). 
This distinction is reflected in a difference in the scope of quantifi- 
ers (compare [14], pp. 235-236). Taking ‘A’ as the name of the 
author, while 
(1) Vp (p is included in the book > A believes that p) is true, 
(2) A believes that Vp (p is included in the book > p) is false. 
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Furthermore, 
(3) A believes that - Vp (p is included in the book > p) 
is true. Moreover, such a disclaimer of infallibility strikes one as 
entirely reasonable. Contradiction would arise only if the author 
were to believe that he was always right and believe that he was not 
always right, i.e. would arise only if both (2) and (3) were true. 
It is only when one looks at the preface case, in reality a case in 
which inconsistent beliefs are held, as if it were a case in which 
contradictory beliefs are held, that it seems plausible to resolve the 
paradox by insisting that the different sets of evidence for the 
beliefs are not independent. For if a person holds contradictory 
beliefs, i.e. believes that p and believes that - p (or believes that [sl 
& s2 & . . . sn] and believes that - [sl & s2 & . . . sn] ) then clearly 
he ought to give one of them up, for his two sets of evidence cannot 
be independent. Any evidence for the one will be evidence against 
the other, so that he will be unjustified in continuing to hold both 
beliefs. 
But the preface case is one in which the author inconsistently 
believes that s l ,  believes that s2, . . . believes that sn, and believes 
that - (sl & s2 , . . sn). Nowhere need one assume that he also 
believes that (sl & s2 & . . . sn). Therefore there is no reason to 
think that the evidence e l  for the disclaimer in the preface is not 
independent of any of the grounds g l ,  82, . . . gn for the statements 
in the book. 
The only reason that one could have for supposing that in believing 
each statement, the author thereby believes their conjunction, and 
thus holds contradictory rather than merely inconsistent beliefs, is 
the view, conscious or unconscious, that to believe each of a num- 
ber of propositions is to believe their conjunction (see [21], pp. 211, 
213). This ‘conjunction principle’ i.e.: 
Conjunction Principle 1 
(4) Vx Vp Vq ((x believes that p & x  believes that q ) x  x believes 
is false. To believe that p and believe that q is not necessarily to 
believe that p and q. 
that (P 4)) 
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A popular defence of Conjunction Principle 1 is that there is no 
possible way of distinguishing between believing a number of pro- 
positions and believeing their conjunction since first, belief is dispo- 
sitional (e.g. [5] ,  passim, 132, [7] ,  pp. 54-55, [31], pp. 172-173) and 
second, there is no way of distinguishing the behavioural manifesta- 
tions of a number of separate beliefs from those of a belief in their 
conjunction. But even if we are generous enough to grant the claim 
that beliefs are dispositions (for strong objections to this see [2] and 
[IS]), the joint manifestations of two separate beliefs may be differ- 
ent from those of a belief in the relevant conjunction. Take the 
following example. A motorcyclist drives through streets with which 
he is acquainted but not yet familiar. He correctly turns left at the 
church and then immediately right at the service station. His belief 
that he must turn left at the church is manifested by simply making 
the turn, and likewise for his belief that he must turn right at the 
service station. But his belief that he must turn left at the church 
and right at the service station, held when better practised at the 
route, may be differently manifested by his behaviour at the first 
turn. This might include holding but not releasing the indicator 
toggle so as to reverse it quickly, maximising the lean to the left in 
order to facilitate a subsequently opposing lean and the ‘line’.taken 
by the machine as it snakes, rather than dog-legs, through the turns. 
That the manifestations of separate beliefs may exist without a 
putative belief in the relevant conjunction being manifested is fur- 
ther shown by the next two examples which I will give to attack 
Conjunction Principle 1. 
It is interesting to note that Kyburg attempts to dissolve the 
‘lottery paradox’ by rejecting a ‘conjunction principle’ ( [14], p. 232) 
namely that 
Kyburg’s Conjunction Principle 
( 5 )  If S is a body of reasonably accepted statements and sl  belongs 
to S and s2 belongs to S then the conjunction of s l  and s2 
belongs to S.  
Since this is a conjunction principle for rational belief rather than 
belief per se it should be distinguished from Conjunction Principle 
1. Kyburg’s Conjunction Principle is ambiguous between the strong 
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claim that if one reasonably accepts or believes each of a number of 
statements then one must accept or believe their conjunction (this 
being reasonable) or whether it makes the weaker claim that if one 
reasonably accepts or believes them and accepts or believes their 
conjunction, then this latter acceptance or belief is reasonable. I 
will shortly label these claims ‘Conjunction Principle 2’ and ‘Con- 
junction Principle 3’, and argue that both are false. 
Kyburg provides little in the way of reasons for rejecting conjunc- 
tion principles. Indeed he says: 
It is difficult to give an argument against the conjunction principle, partly 
because it is so obvious to me that it is false, and partly because it is so 
obvious to certain other people that it is true. ([14], p. 250) 
The nearest he gets to giving a reason is that ‘it seems preposterous 
to suppose that all our inductive knowledge has to be embodiable in 
a single fat statement’ ([14], p. 250). However, this is questionable 
on two grounds. First, what is being attacked is a conjunction 
principle for knowledge rather than belief or rational belief. Sec- 
ond, if ‘embodiable’ means ‘logically possible to express’ then it is 
far from obvious that the supposition is false. It is plausible to think 
that God could express the conjunction of truths known to Man. 
One reason against Conjunction Principle 1 that has been ad- 
vanced and has met with disagreement ([21], pp. 205-207) is that 
‘. . . it is possible to believe a number of propositions and yet be 
ignorant of the operation of conjunction’ ([4], p. 303). But leaving 
this aside, there are three quite decisive reasons why Conjunction 
Principle 1 is false. 
First, it is surely absurd to credit someone with beliefs of things of 
which he can have no understanding. We might call this the ‘re- 
quirement of understanding’. It explains why we might credit a dog 
with the rudimentary belief that there is food in the bowl but would 
certainly not credit it with the belief that it will be beaten every 
second Sunday in Lent. But a person who can only ‘hold a few ideas 
in his head’ might severally believe each of a series of propositions, 
where the number of propositions is so large that he is unable to 
understand or consider their conjunction. In fact when the proposi- 
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tions are the corpus of a very large book this is quite likely even for 
a person of normal mental capacity. A rough analogy might be a 
boy in a supermarket who has forgotten to bring his mother’s 
shopping list and who can remember to buy each item on seeing it 
but who lacks the memory to write out the list for himself.2 
At this point the requirement of understanding is sometimes met 
with the objection (e.g. [6], p. 133, [24], p. 496) that people 
sometimes believe things on authority (e.g. that of lecturers in 
physics or biology) that they do not understand, for example that 
entropy is increasing or that fusiform fish have heterocercal tails. 
But it is surely absurd to think that a student who has not yet 
acquired the concept of entropy or of fusiform fish can really 
believe these propositions. Rather, he believes that what he has 
been told is true, e.g. merely believes that the sentence ‘Fusiform 
fish have heterocercal tails’ says something true, although he does 
not, indeed cannot, know what it says. This is something which he 
can understand, and thus believe, but is quite different from a 
putative belief that fusiform fish have heterocercal tails. Believing 
that what is said is true is different from believing the truth (or 
falsehood) that is said. This is why it is true in one sense and false in 
another, to say that ‘we may allow. . . symbols to function in an 
account of someone’s mental life even in cases where the person 
significantly misunderstands them’ ([6], p. 133) and thus why it 
does not follow that there are cases in which ‘the content of. .  . 
belief has not been fully mastered by the believer’ ([6], p. 138). 
A further objection that has been made is that the requirement of 
understanding ‘makes the disastrous assumption that a believer 
needs to understand every sentence which expresses his belief‘ 
([21], p. 206). Admittedly, the assumption is disastrous, as argu- 
ments from translation and counterexamples of rudimentary animal 
and infantile beliefs show. But the requirement of understanding 
does not make this assumption. To think that it does is to fail to 
distinguish understanding that which is meant by a sentence from 
2. For a discussion of how the requirement of understanding defeats the similar 
monotonic principle that one always believes the entailments of what one be- 
lieves, see [27]. 
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understanding the meaning of that sentence. As I have stressed 
before ( [29], pp. 280-282) , the locus of understanding is crucial. To 
understand that which is meant by a sentence is just to grasp the 
proposition expressed by it. Thus an Englishman who knows no 
French may grasp the proposition It is raining and hence understand 
that which is meant by a variety of sentences, including not only the 
sentence ‘It is raining’ but also ‘I1 pleut’. But understanding the 
meaning of a sentence is not only to understand that which is meant 
by it but is also to know that this sentence does mean this. Thus it is 
entirely consistent to suppose that the Englisman does not under- 
stand the meaning of the particular French sentence ‘I1 pleut’. The 
requirement of understanding is the innocuous one of understand- 
ing that which is meant by a sentence, not the disastrous one of 
understanding that that sentence has that meaning. 
Second, a person who believes that p and q, may have considered 
whether p and considered whether q, without having considered 
whether p and q, in which case he does not consciously believe that 
p and q. But there is no reason to hypothesise an unconscious belief 
that p and q. The only reason that one would have for so doing 
would be an assumption of the very view under dispute. An ex- 
treme example of this kind of case is that of holding contradictory 
beliefs. Someone may present an argument containing many prem- 
ises, including p and including - p ,  and being sincere, believe each 
premise separately, i.e.: 
Possibility Of Contradictory Beliefs 
(6) 0 3x 3 p  (x believes that p & x believes that -p)  
Although these premises may be perspicuously contradictory when 
considered together, he may have only considered them separately, 
which allows him to hold both beliefs. 
Third, suppose that a certain specific person never believes what 
he knows to be false, i.e.: 
Possibility Of Knowledge Consistent Belief 
(7) 0 3x Vp (x knows that - p 3 - x believes that p) 
This is logically possible, indeed a commonplace. But now while he 
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may believe and hence understand the proposition p ,  and believe 
and hence understand the proposition - p ,  he cannot believe the 
proposition p 6; - p ,  even unconsciously. This would entail that he 
understands this proposition, which being perspicuously selfcon- 
tradictory, he would know to be false, and hence, given the terms of 
the example, would not believe. Notice that I am not claiming that 
it is impossible to believe that p &  -p ,  i.e. I am not denying that: 
Possibility Of Believing Self - Contradictions 
(8) 0 3x 3 p  (x believes that (p & - p) ) 
Indeed I have defended the possibility of believing selfcontradic- 
tions elsewhere ([29] ). My example merely assumes the possibility 
of several contradictory beliefs and the failure to disbelieve what 
one knows, which thereby demonstrates the possibility of holding 
two contradictory beliefs without believing a self - contradiction, 
which in turn demonstrates the falsity of Conjunction Principle 1. 
This does not, of course, commit me to the claim that one can never 
believe a selfcontradiction, a claim that should be avoided if only 
because it is at least arguable that one can sometimes believe what 
one knows to be false (see [ l l ] ,  pp. 275-278, [29], p. 282, [30], p. 
Since it is false that to severally believe a number of propositions 
entails believing their conjunction, it is likewise false that to ratio- 
nally believe them, i.e. believe them with good reason, is to ratio- 
nally believe their conjunction, i.e. believe it with good reason. For 
if it is possible to believe a number of propositions without believing 
their conjunction then it is possible to believe them with good 
reason without believing their conjunction. In other words, 
Conjunction Principle 2 
(9) V x V p V q ( (x rationally believes that p & x rationally believes 
44). 
that q) 3 x rationally believes that (p & 4)) 
is false. 
Even if a person rationally believes that p, rationally believes that 
q and also believes that p and q, he need not rationally believe that 
p and q, i.e.: 
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Conjunction Principle 33 
(10) V x V p V q ( (x rationally believes p & x rationally believes q & 
is false. An apt case has been suggested by Foley as a counter- 
example to this last version of the conjunction principle, or as he 
puts it, the principle that relevant evidence available to someone 
which is sufficient to justify his believing p and believing q, is 
sufficient to justify his believing p and q ([lo], p. 249). In Foley’s 
fair die case the diceplayer is justified in believing that either 1, 2, 
3, 4 or 5 will come up, i.e. that 6 will not come up, is justified in 
believing that either 1, 2, 3 ,  4 or 6 will come up, i.e. that 5 will not 
come up, and so on. Were we to accept the conjunction principle in 
either of its last two versions we would have to say that the dice- 
player’s knowledge that the die is fair and six-sided either forces 
him into holding justified beliefs (on Conjunction Principle 2) or 
justifies existing beliefs (on Conjunction Principle 3) that none of 
the sides will come up, which is clearly absurd. 
Of course, an opponent could consistently agree that the conjunc- 
tion principle is false and still maintain that the sets of evidence had 
by the author are not independent. But the evidence which e l  
represents may be of a quite different sort from any of g l ,  82, 
. . . gn. It may itself be a calculation of probabilities relative to other 
evidence for, as I have argued, while each of a number of state- 
ments may be highly probable, relative to the evidence, their con- 
junction may be highly improbable relative to it. Or  the author’s 
confidence in each statement may be very high, but not complete, 
so that the gaps in his confidence in each, add up to a considerable 
lack of confidence in their conjunction. Hence part of the evidence 
for a belief that - (sl  & s2 & . . . sn) i.e. for the belief that not all 
the statements in the book are true, may be simply that n is a large 
number, i.e. that there are many statements in the book. For 
example, in her ‘Translator’s Preface’ to Sartre’s Being and Noth- 
x believes (p & 9)) 3 x rationally believes (p & 4)) 
3. A view which follows from Hempel’s view that it is rational for a man to believe 
the logical consequences of the set of propositions which he rationally believes. 
([12] pp. 15c151) 
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ingness, Hazel Barnes says ‘In a work as long as this there are 
certain to be mistakes’ ( [ 3 ) ,  p. vii, my italics). But it is hard to see 
how this evidence can count against any of the beliefs of the 
individual statements in the book. 
Indeed, the view that ceteris paribus, the longer a list of state- 
ments, the greater the likelihood of error, seems a quite different 
kind of justification from any that supports particular claims made 
in a book, for example, on history. One might even take the more 
extreme view, 2 la Passmore, that this kind of proposition is a 
priori.‘ And if evidence for it is forthcoming, it is the kind of 
evidence which any proofreader or computer programmer will 
adduce from experience. The evidence might even take the form of 
a comparison of the number of errors in short lists with that in long 
ones. But in any of these cases it is difficult to see how such 
evidence could be relevant to the truth of a particular historical 
statement, for example, as in Passmore’s book. 
In fact, evidence which justifies a belief that p and justifies a 
belief that q, may justify a belief that - (p & q), let alone failing to 
justify a belief that p & q. Suppose that the evidence is that the 
probability that p is the same as the probability that q,  namely 213 
(relative to some further evidence) and that the propositions are 
logically independent. This justifies both a belief that p and a belief 
that q,  since in both cases, what is believed is more probable than 
not relative to the available evidence. But it is also evidence that the 
probability that p and q is 213 x 213, i.e. 419, i.e. less probable than 
not, which justifies a belief that - (p & q). 
This in itself constitutes an argument for the possibility of rational 
inconsistent belief independently of the preface example. Take a 
gambler who bets on, and believes, only what he knows is more 
likely than not. Suppose also the highly plausible claim that it is 
always rational to believe what one knows is probable relative to 
one’s evidence, i.e.: 
4. The spirit of this idea is echoed in Shirer’s preface to The Rise and Full of the 
Third Reich where he says ‘. . . in all human records and testimony there are 
bound to be baffling contradictions’ ((231 pp. xi-xii). 
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Knowledge Of Probabilities Principle 
(11) Vx Vp ( ( x  knows that probably p & x believes that p) 3 x 
Suppose that the gambler knows that the odds on a horse accurately 
reflect the probability of it winning and that the odds of Horse X 
winning in race 1 are the same as that of Horse Y winning in race 2, 
namely 1 to 2 (thus reflecting the fact that the probability of each 
horse winning is 2/3). Suppose also that he knows that the races are 
run simultaneously - so that the outcome of either cannot effect 
that of the other. He will bet, and rationally believe, that Horse X 
will win, will bet, and rationally believe, that Horse Y will win, but 
will bet, and rationally believe, that it is not the case that both 
horses will win. This is an eminently rational procedure, for an 
accumulator is a notoriously riskier bet than a series of single bets to 
win, as is reflected by the greater profitability of success at the 
former. Yet his beliefs are inconsistent, since the conjunction of 
what he believes, i.e. [Horse X will win & Horse Y will win & 
- (Horse X will win & Horse Y will win)], is logically impossible. 
rationally believes that p) . 
111. Not another probabilistic solution 
It is important to note that my way of dissolving the paradox is not 
the same as probabilistic attempts to solve it. Such attempts build 
probabilities into the content of the author’s beliefs, whereas I merely 
include assessments of such probabilities as a possible part of 
the evidence for such beliefs. Where n is a large number and the 
statements in the book are logically independent, the author’s 
assessment of the probability of each statement being true relative 
to this may justify him in believing each, whereas his assessment of 
the probability of all being true may justify him in believing that not 
all are true. And if such probabilistic evidence justifies the author in 
believing that - (sl & s2 & . . . sn), this is not to say that he thereby 
merely believes that probably - (sl & s2 & . . . sn). 
At this point it might be objected that my dissolution nonetheless 
telescopes into a probabilistic solution, given a natural equation of 
confidence with belief in high probability. Thus New comments: 
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Instead of saying that a man believes veryprobabfy s l  . . ., we may equaliy 
well say that he has a very strong belief in s l  . . . and, correspondingly, a 
very strong belief in - (sl & s2 & . . . & sn) ([17], p. 342, New’s italics). 
If this equation is true then an author who both believes that - (sl 
& s2 & . . . sn) and who does so strongly, thereby believes that 
probably - (sl & s2 & . . . sn). 
But while this equation may be natural, it is false. First, a strong 
belief that p cannot be the same belief as a belief that probably p. 
For one thing, to believe strongly is to believe in a certain manner, 
i.e. with a high degree of conviction. But this manner of believing 
tells us nothing about what is believed (e.g. that it is probable that 
p), nor vice versa. To equate believing strongly that p with believing 
that it is probable that p, is to confuse the character of the believer’s 
believing with the content of what he believes. Believing fervently 
that Mary is giving a speech neither entails nor is entailed by 
believing that Mary is fervently giving a speech. The confusion 
between the character and the content of beliefs is perhaps facilitat- 
ed by the fact that the term ‘belief‘ is lexically ambiguous between 
these, as in ‘my passionate beliefs‘ on the one hand, and ‘our shared 
beliefs’ on the other. 
At this point a die-hard defender of the equation might concede 
that in general there is a distinction between the character and the 
content of beliefs and yet hold that the distinction cannot be main- 
tained in the special case of strong beliefs and beliefs in probabil- 
ities. But exceptions need to be argued for. The onus of proof is on 
the die-hard defender, just as it is on him to prove that appearances 
to the contrary, describing the preface case in terms of strong 
beliefs rather than beliefs in probabilities will make the inconsisten- 
cy disappear. 
Furthermore, the equation is suspect for two reasons. First, 
probabilities are irreducibly what they are only relative to relevant 
evidence. It is incoherent to talk about them as existing indepen- 
dently of the evidence. For example, if I have evidence that a ball 
has been drawn at random from an urn containing 90 % black balls 
but unknown to me the ball drawn from the urn is a wooden ball 
and all the wooden balls are white then my evidence cannot make it 
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the case that the ‘objective’ or nonrelative probability that this ball 
is black is 9/10, since the fact excluded from my evidence ensures 
and thus makes certain that it is not black. Or suppose I have 
evidence E l  that a ball has been drawn at random from an urn 
containing 10 white and 10 black balls. I then get new evidence E2 
that this ball is one of 10 wooden balls of which 1 is black and 9 are 
white. Then assuming that evidence creates objective probabilities, 
E l  makes the objective probability that the ball is black 1/2, and El 
and E2 together make this objective probability 1/10, which is 
absurd. Thus ‘It is probable that p relative to the evidence that E’ 
cannot be cashed out as ‘If E then it is probable that p’. Therefore 
the expression ‘. . . believes that it is probably the case that -’ is 
elliptical for ‘. . . believes that it is probably the case that - relative 
to the evidence that***’. This is a three-place operator that needs a 
name and two sentences to make a sentence. On the other hand, 
the expression ‘. . . believes strongly that -’ is a two-place operator 
that only needs a name and a sentence to make a sentence. As 
Ajdukeiwicz would say ( [l]), these two expressions are of different 
syntactic types [s/nss] and [sins]. It is therefore difficult to see how 
the equation of strong belief with belief in probabilities is to suc- 
ceed. 
In reply to this criticism, the defender of the equation might well 
claim that there are only two places to be filled, on the grounds that 
the expression ‘. . . believes that probably -’ should be interpreted 
as ‘Relative to the total evidence available to him, . . . believes that 
it is probably the case that -’. 
However, this interpretation falls afoul of the distinction dis- 
cussed earlier, between the character and the content of belief, or 
more accurately in the present context, between the existence and 
the content of belief. Consequently, the interpretation relativises 
belief when it should relativise probability. It is one thing to say that 
what a person believes (that it is probable that p) is what it is only 
relative to the evidence, and quite another to say that he only holds 
a belief relative to the total evidence available to him. 
Even if it were correct to relativise belief in this way, it would not 
do the job it is supposed to, namely eliminate a place in the 
expression. For if we assume that someone holds the belief that 
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probably p relative to the total evidence available to him, then 
surely we need to say what this evidence is, in which case a 
sentence-place is reintroduced into the expression. Moreover, we 
can further consider the possibility not only that he does hold this 
belief but also that it is correct. But this is to consider the possibility 
that it is probable that p, and, as we have seen, this must be to 
consider the possibility that it is probable that p relative to the total 
evidence that ***. Thus if the interpretation were correct it would 
have to be modified still further to ‘Relative to the total evidence 
that ***  available to him, . . . believes that it is probably the case 
that - relative to the evidence that ***’ .  
Second, a reductio is afforded by the fact that while ‘totally 
convinced’ is coherent, ‘totally probable’ appears to be nonsense. 
We can legitimately say that someone believes something as strong- 
ly as possible, but not that something is as probable as possible, 
unless this is just a misleading way of saying that it is logically 
certain. For any degree of probability can be improved upon, with 1 
as the limiting case. But I can be correctly and totally convinced of 
something I correctly do not believe to be a logical certainty, e.g. 
that I am not the only person currently alive. If believing something 
with total conviction is to believe it to be totally probable, then 
either I believe nonsense, which is impossible (see [29], p. 281), or I 
hold the incorrect belief that the presence of other live persons is a 
logical certainly. Yet my original belief is coherent, possible and 
correct. 
If strong be1ie.f that p is not the same as belief that probably p, 
does it entail it? Even if it does, this does nothing to weaken the 
preface case as an example of rational inconsistent beliefs. For 
assuming that the entailment, the author now has two sets of beliefs. 
First, he strongly believes that s l ,  strongly believes s2 . . . strongly 
believes that sn and strongly believes that - (sl & s2 & . . . sn). 
Second, and supposedly by virtue of this first set, he also believes 
that probably s l ,  believes that probably s2, . . . believes that prob- 
ably sn and believes that probably - (sl & s2 & . . . sn). Admittedly, 
there is no inconsistency in this second set of beliefs, but there is still 
inconsistency in the first set, which remains intact as an example of 
rational inconsistent beliefs. 
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In fact believing strongly that p neither entails nor is entailed by 
believing that it is probable that p. Counterexamples can be pro- 
duced against both entailments. 
Against the claim that a strong belief that p entails a belief that 
probably p, a racegoer may cherish the strong belief that a particu- 
lar outsider will win although to every racegoer’s knowledge and 
belief the odds are long. If a coin is tossed nine times and each time 
comes up heads, then to believe that the next toss will probably be 
tails is to commit the ‘gambler’s fallacy’. Yet even if we recognise 
the fallacy and cease to hold this belief, we may still believe strongly 
that the next toss will be tails. Indeed it is this very temptation that 
motivates us to expose the fallacy. 
Against the claim that a belief that probably p entails a strong 
belief that p, consider a man who is still in the grip of the fallacy but 
who is starting to emancipate himself from it. He commits the 
fallacy by believing that it is probable that the next toss will be tails 
but has enough inkling of statistical theory to suspect that there may 
be something wrong with his reasoning, and accordingly, has no 
strong belief that the next toss will be tails. Likewise a racegoer who 
is thoroughly versed in the odds of the next runners may find that 
his betting instincts have deserted him so that he has no strong 
beliefs, or even no beliefs at all, about what will, as opposed to what 
probably will, win. 
Moreover a reductio can be invoked against the claim that a 
strong belief that p entails a belief that probably p. It is surely 
possible for someone to believe strongly that probably p. For exam- 
ple, a dice-player might strongly believe that it is probable that 6 
will not come up in each of the next three throws. But on the 
putative entailment he would believe that it is probable that it is 
probable that p, which seems to be nonsense. If it is nonsense, then 
since it is not nonsense to say that someone believes strongly that 
probably p, the entailment fails. If it is not nonsense, it at least has 
an absurd consequence. A belief that its being more probable than 
not that p, is itself merely probable, is indicative of a lesser degree 
of confidence in the truth of the proposition p than a belief that it is 
probable that p. Conversely, a claim that it is more likely than not 
that p, is surely bolder than the claim that it is likely that this is the 
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likelihood that p. But it is absurd to think that by holding the belief 
that p strongly, a person thereby manifests a decreased level of 
confidence in the truth of p !  
IV. The ethics of belief 
One can deny neither the inconsistency of the author’s beliefs (via a 
probabilistic formulation) nor their rationality (via an insistence 
that the sets of evidence are dependent). The preface case shows 
that a person can believe rationally and inconsistently. Only if one 
clings to the view that the consistency of a set of beliefs is a sine qua 
non of their rationality ([12], pp. 150-151, [16], p. 202, [20], p. 16, 
[22], p. 7, [25], p. 31) does the preface case seem paradoxical. Yet it 
is itself a counterexample to this very view. 
The possibility of rational inconsistent beliefs has repercussions 
for the ethics of belief. Should we abandon the view that if a 
person’s belief is rational then he has a right to hold it ([8], p. 186), 
or abandon the view that if his beliefs are inconsistent then he ought 
to give at least one of them up? ( [9], pp. 84-85). It would be hard to 
deny this first view and indeed the expressions ‘rational belief‘ and 
‘justified belief‘ are practically synonyms. Moreover, the examples 
of rational inconsistent belief which I have considered are cases in 
which the believer clearly has a right to his beliefs. In its present 
formulation the second requirement is surely too strict. Even if a 
person realises that his beliefs are inconsistent, he cannot have a 
duty to give up any particular belief rather than any other if he has 
no rational basis for disfavouring it. In the preface case, for exam- 
ple, the author has no rational preference against any particular 
statement in the book, nor against the disclaimer in the preface. In 
fact his belief of the latter seems, if anything, to be the most 
justified of his beliefs, for an admission of human fallibility is a 
laudably rational recognition of the limits of human cognition. Nor 
can anyone say that he has a duty to give them all up, except 
perhaps in the special case when they are also contradictory and the 
evidence for each is equally poor. 
At this point we have to take account of a higher ethic that clearly 
exists in a rational community and which overrides the ethics of 
THE PREFACE PARADOX DISSOLVED 139 
belief, namely an ethic of knowledge. This says that one has a duty 
to take all possible steps to know what is true or failing that to 
believe only what is true. Thus a fairer formulation of the ethic of 
belief with respect to inconsistency is that if a person recognises that 
his beliefs are inconsistent then he ought to try to secure knowledge 
or rational belief of which is false. Many an author, Passmore 
included, appeals to his readers for help in this. If he is successful in 
it then he will forfeit his right to hold the relevant belief, for the 
balance of evidence, and hence.the rationality of the belief, will 
then be changed. 
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